Key questions posed for the workshop:
• Changes in the security environment have put US allies in Europe and Northeast Asia in the nuclear crosshairs of regional challengers, at the same time that the nuclear ban movement has politically complicated life under the US nuclear umbrella. How are allies adjusting their deterrence strategies to new requirements?
• What lessons do allies in Europe region draw from the experience of allies in Northeast Asia, and vice versa?
• What can be done to strengthen confidence in the credibility and effectiveness of the US nuclear guarantee?
Jacek Durkalec (2018), "U.S. Extended Deterrence in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific: Similarities, Differences, and Interdependencies," Workshop Summary, Center for Global Security Research: https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Summary_Report_ED_JAN2018final.pdf
This workshop summary outlines developments in the extended deterrence relationships between the United States and its partners in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. It outlines conversations concerning deployed capabilities in both theaters and notes the contemporary challenges facing U.S. partners in the two regions. It concludes by acknowledging the interconnected nature of extended deterrence commitments across both theaters and the importance of thinking about "extended deterrence in cross-regional terms."
Masashi Murano (2018) Tsuruoka focuses on the challenges posed to Japan's long-term security by Russia's foreign policy in Crimea and increased NATO-Russian competition given the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. The article also examines the U.S.-Japan alliance and considers how it might be transformed to reflect the changing security environment.
Panel 4: The nuclear deterrence taboo and Europe's nuclear future
Key questions:
• In many Western countries, a taboo has formed that inhibits discussion of deterrence and nuclear weapons. It has been reinforced by ICAN's strategy of shaming countries cooperating with the United States on nuclear deterrence. What should and can be done?
• What are the consequences of failing to create a more balanced public discourse? How might that be done?
• What can the experiences of Japan and South Korea contribute to Europe's exploration of possible pathways forward?
Camille Grand (2016), "Nuclear Deterrence and the Alliance in the 21st Century," NATO Review: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/nuclear-deterrence-alliance-21st-century-nato/EN/index.htm
Grand argues that NATO must enhance both its conventional and nuclear capabilities in the context of the changing Euro-Atlantic security environment. In upcoming summits, Grand calls for clear messaging of NATO's nuclear policy, efforts to foster nuclear debate within the Alliance, and clear warnings to adversaries that nuclear use would fundamentally alter the dynamics of any confrontation.
Edward Ifft (2017), "A Challenge to Nuclear Deterrence," Arms Control Today: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-03/features/challenge-nuclear-deterrence
Ifft outlines the diverging views among several states concerning the need for a general prohibition of nuclear weapons in the form of a ban treaty. The article examines the drivers of support for the ban amid stalled progress toward nuclear disarmament. Ifft goes on to outline the various challenges associated with pursuing a ban, arguing that "going to low levels or zero without effective verification and agreed elimination procedures would be highly dangerous."
Karl-Heinz Kamp (2018) Kamp argues that while NATO reacted swiftly and decisively to Russia's aggression in Ukraine, bolstering conventional deterrence, a discussion of the implications for the Alliance's nuclear strategy has been lagging. He concludes that, regarding the conundrum of "how" to deter "whom" with "what", although it has become clear that the addressee of NATO's declaratory policy is Russia, the "what" -i.e. the nuclear posture in Europe and in the United States -and the way of how to combine the how, whom and what with a coherent and credible deterrence concept still require answers.
Matthew Kroenig (2016), "Toward a More Flexible NATO Nuclear Posture," Atlantic Council: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/toward-a-more-flexible-nato-nuclear-posture
Kroenig outlines a range of options available to NATO to bolster its position in light of a Russia that has placed an increased emphasis on nuclear weapons in its military strategy and doctrine. These options include numerous nuclear and nonnuclear alternatives, which are subsequently assessed based on several factors including capability, escalation control, burden sharing, and cost effectiveness. He concludes that the most promising option is for NATO to equip its Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) with a nuclear-armed, air-to-surface cruise missile.
Oliver Thränert (2017) Volpe and Kühn examine the reinvigoration of Germany's security apparatus. Specifically, they analyze three nuclear options debated among a small circle of German policy-makers and academics: "(1) fielding an indigenous nuclear force; (2) preserving a latent hedge capacity; or (3) cooperating with the French to open an extended nuclear deterrence umbrella over Europe." The article concludes that all three options represent poor policy options given the high risks associated with them but goes on to argue that the reinvigoration of the nuclear debate is symptomatic of a rising Germany with consequences for both Europe and the international order. Published prior the conclusion of the Ban Treaty process, Williams' article examines the reinvigorated debate concerning nuclear ethics following the rise of the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative. Importantly, the article points to the key differences between arguments to ban nuclear weapons and past efforts to ban other types of military technology and concludes that the HINW movement ought to "abandon the ban" in favor of initiatives to revive the NPT process and the Conference on Disarmament while giving voice to those states frustrated by the lack of progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Panel 5: The balance of strategic influence in Europe: shifting in whose favour?
• Russia is competing to strengthen its political, military, and economic position vis-à-vis the West, while NATO and the European Union have sought to protect their positions by adjusting to new challenges and the United States has set out a more competitive approach. From Moscow's perspective, how is the balance shifting?
• Do Western capitals share this assessment or take a different view?
Deborah Yarsike Ball (2017) Ball examines how and why Russia is extensively employing information warfare to ensure regime survival and in the service of its increasingly aggressive foreign policy goals. A theme throughout is how the West has yet to grasp the full implications of the Russian word informatsia and the challenge posed by Putin's information strategy. The author concludes by arguing that Russia will continue to employ information warfare at an increasing rate as long as the strategy remains successful. This report discusses the evolution of Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin, focusing on identifying challenges Russia poses to the stability of Europe and the North Atlantic alliance. The authors argue that countering the challenges of this new strategic situation requires enhanced NATO capabilities and deterrence posture. This can be achieved through U.S. leadership and increased defense resources from all members of NATO.
Eric Edelman and
Kathleen Hicks and Lisa Samp (eds., 2017), "Recalibrating U.S. Strategy Toward Russia: A New Time for Choosing," Center for Strategic and International Studies: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170329_Hicks_USStrategyTowardRussia_Web.pdf?PHeYffp2ZLh9ZiFy7s99TukdFvRdWRLX
This study seeks to provide an understanding of Russian strategic motivations and objectives as well as the tools it uses to advance its goals. In addition, it seeks to lay out a comprehensive strategy for securing U.S. and transatlantic interests in the face of the challenge posed by Russia. Chapter 3 discusses Russian instruments of power, while U.S. and allied instruments of power are the subject of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 explores options for responding to the challenge posed by Russia. Notably, the study argues that the Western response to the Russia challenge thus far remains far removed from what it should be. Trenin posits that the current security environment in Europe is the result of the failure to properly include Russia in the regional security system. He argues that efforts to increase European security should focus on: preventing direct military conflict between Russia and NATO; increasing cooperation where interests overlap; de-escalating the conflict in Donbas; resolving tensions in the South Caucasus and Moldova; cooperating towards a political settlement in Syria; preventing further NATO enlargement; and recognizing that long-term security will depend on the global security environment.
Nikos Tsafos (2018), "Who's Afraid of Russian Gas? Bridging the Transatlantic Divide," Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Briefs: https://www.csis.org/analysis/whos-afraid-russian-gas-bridging-transatlanticdivide
Tsafos calls upon Europe and the U.S. to separate gas from the other challenges posed by Russia, arguing that doing so will boost energy security, protect and strengthen the transatlantic alliance, and allow for increased focused on issues where the West can resist Russian power more meaningfully. He supports this position with three key points: energy does not give Russia as much power as is usually assumed; an antagonistic strategy is unlikely to succeed or be sustained in bringing about change; and the best response to Russian gas is a set of policies that Europe should pursue anyway and that are unrelated to Russia.
Celeste Wallander (2013), "Mutually Assured Stability: Establishing US-Russia Security Relations for a New Century," Atlantic Council: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Mutually_Assured_Stability.pdf
Wallander argues that U.S.-Russian strategic stability can no longer be sustained through MAD in the twenty-first century, which has witnessed a transformation in military technology that alters the logic of MAD as mutually understood in the context of the Cold War and a transformation in global security relations away from the bipolar model of the second half of the twentieth century. She observes that the U.S. conception of strategic stability places emphasis on changing global security relations while the Russian conception emphasizes changes in military technology. Wallander concludes by recommending efforts be made to bridge this divide by conceptualizing strategic stability through the logic of Mutually Assured Stability (MAS), which she defines as "a condition in which neither party has the intention or capability to exercise unilateral advantage for political or military exploitation through preemptive coercion or military strike in such a way that precludes response, negotiation, or compromise."
Katarzyna Zysk (2018) Zysk posits that the 2018 NPR makes an accurate assessment of Russian military strategy, arguing that the "defensive" nature of Russian military doctrine, its increasing emphasis on non-nuclear deterrence, and the emphasis placed on the initial period of war forsee the limited use of nuclear weapons. Zysk supports this argument with analysis of Russian strategic concepts and doctrine; defense procurement and deployments; and operational patterns in military exercises and training.
